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Abstract
A case study (PCM-newspaper publishers) demonstrates how the governance structure of 
a publisher is altered as a result of the changing relationship between business units and a 
shared service center (SSC). Drawing on a model based on transaction cost economics 
(TCE) we try to find theoretical explanations for the observed changes. In turn, these 
explanations may provide managers with economic arguments to support the choice of 
certain governance and control structures related to (shared) services.
In the case company, only to a certain extent the choices prove to be consistent with our 
theoretical model. Particularly, based on our model we would have expected an 
unambiguous choice for a concentration of the selling of advertisements in a shared 
service center. Moreover, based on our model we would have expected business unit 
management to have the freedom to outsource the selling of advertisements to external 
parties (no captive relationship with the shared service center).
It proved out, however, that business units decided to sell a major part of the 
advertisements themselves. The paper suggests a number of explanations for this 
divergence.
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1. Introduction
An organizational concept that became popular during the mid nineties is the concept of a 
shared service center (SSC) in which non-core activities of business units are 
concentrated. An SSC is a rather independent organizational unit that provides services to 
other organizational units that originally perform these services within their own unit (‘in 
house’). The SSC concept is closely linked to the widely used multidivisional structure. 
The advantage of a multidivisional structure is the delegation of powers and 
responsibilities to the organizational level where the relevant information and knowledge 
is available. This at least partly solves the problem of information asymmetry within 
organizations. However, the disadvantage is that each business unit is engaged in tasks 
that do not belong to its core business, such as HRM, IT and Accounting and Finance. 
Because of improved ICT, it is now possible to concentrate these kinds of tasks in a 
separate service unit and to realize economies of scale. By introducing such a service unit 
(an SSC), the benefits of a divisional business organization are kept, but without the cost 
disadvantages (Strikwerda, 2005). Non-commercial organizations, such as ministries, 
municipalities, hospitals and universities, have also started to embrace the concept and set 
up SSC’s for supporting tasks (Janssen & Joha, 2006)1.
This article will examine the impact an SSC has on the governance structure or 
management control structure of service transactions. What changes occur in the 
institutional frameworks and incentive structures that ultimately aim to increase the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of the services? The research takes place against the 
background of a model designed by Vosselman (2002). In that model the concentration of 
supporting services is linked with the horizontalization of management control 
relationships. This paper further develops the model by focusing on management control 
issues with respect to an SSC.
The remainder of this paper has the following outline. First, the background of SSC's 
is addressed. Then a TCE-based model will be described, with particular attention to the
1 In this article the figure of Janssen & Joha (2006, p. 103) is slightly adjusted as we do not find it 
relevant to include a staff department. A staff department can also be organized as a central 
department.
underlying transaction cost economics theory. In a next section the model is tailor- 
designed to issues regarding the choices in the governance structure of supporting 
activities (services). Then significant changes in the governance structure of services in 
the case company (PCM Publishers, PCM hereafter) will be described and analysed 
against the background of our theoretical model. The paper ends up with a conclusion.
2. SSC’s and a TCE model
2.1. Shared Service Centers
Case studies performed by Strikwerda show that the term SSC is used quite diversely. It 
is used for independent organizations in low wage countries who deliver worldwide 
services to other organizations, as well as for departments within organizations that 
provide supporting services to several other internal departments. Strikwerda 
distinguished six different types of SSC’s that vary from SSC’s in the form of a central 
staff department to Business Process Outsourcing (Strikwerda, 2005, p.75).
Jansen and Joha (2006) use a narrower definition and make a strict distinction between 
an SSC, a central staff department and outsourcing. A central staff department 
(centralized model) provides top management with relatively much influence at the 
expense of a customer orientation, whereas outsourcing implies a relationship between 
business units and external market parties based on formal contracts (see also Bergeron, 
2003). An SSC, however, is standing close to the internal customer (the business units) 
and the internal customer has a degree of ownership over the service. Based on Janssen 
en Joha (2006, p.103)this distinction can be depicted as in figure 1. The dotted line 
defines the boundary of the organization at large.
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Figure 1. Positioning an SSC
2.2. The choice of a governance structure
The characterization in figure 1 suggests that outsourcing business activities by business 
units can take place both internally in a hierarchical structure, and externally in the 
market. A theory that is strongly involved in the choice between hierarchy and market is 
transaction cost economics (TCE), as to a large extent developed by Williamson (1979; 
1993; 1996; 2000; 2002).
This theory forms the basis for research into the choice of governance structures 
between organizations (Dekker, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Nicholson, Jones 
& Espenlaub, 2006; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000) as well as within 
organizations (Spekle, 2001; Spekle, Van Elten & Kruis, 2007; Vosselman, 2002). From 
the new institutional transaction cost theoretical perspective, a governance structure is an 
“institutional framework within which the integrity of a transaction is decided” 
(Williamson, 1979, p.235). Williamson (1996; 2000; 2002) distinguishes three generic 
governance structures: markets, hierarchies and hybrids. In the hybrid structure, both
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market elements and hierarchical elements can be found. At the basis of TCE-reasoning 
lies the assumption that individuals consciously and rationally choose for a certain 
governance structure. It is assumed that the different individuals involved have different 
kinds of information and knowledge, and that the governance structure should be 
constructed in such a manner that this information and knowledge is activated in the best 
way. TCE also assumes that the parties involved may act opportunistically. Opportunistic 
behavior is the seeking of self-interest with forms of trickery and deceit. Parties are 
mainly concerned about their own interest and are assumed to have the propensity to 
distort relevant information to their advantage. The governance structure has to 
compensate for such potential opportunistic behavior. Starting from the position of a 
market as a generic governance structure, the possibility to compensate for potential 
opportunism by market-based controls decreases as parties get more dependent on each 
other. It then may become efficient for parties to switch to a more hierarchical based 
governance structure.
Although TCE primarily focuses on a generic level, we more specifically draw on this 
theory to explain governance and control choices both within and between organizations. 
In the context of this paper the concepts governance structure and management control 
structure are used as synonyms. Both concepts refer to controlling and incentivizing 
managerial behaviour in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
operations (Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008).2 Vosselman (2002) developed a
2 We agree with the choices Van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens (2008, p. 368) make concerning 
the control of lateral relations. They prefer the term governance above the term management 
control. They perceive the term governance to be a broader term that encompasses all kinds of 
formal management control mechanisms and practices that are put in place by management. In 
turn, important in depth categorizations in management control include for instance a 
categorization made by Simons (1995). He makes a distinction between diagnostic control 
systems, beliefs systems, boundary systems, and interactive control systems. Another 
categorization is for instance that of Van Veen-Dirks & Wijn (2002). They use a triad of control 
forms: diagnostic, interactive and strategic control. In our paper, in stead of deepening the 
concept of management control we broaden it and for that reason we link up with Van der Meer- 
Kooistra and Scapens (2008).
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TCE-based model, containing a number of archetypes o f management control from 
which decision makers can choose. Each archetype contains a distinct and identifiable 
group of control elements and practices (see also Spekle, 2001). The model differentiates 
horizontal management control archetypes from vertical management control archetypes. 
Horizontal management control opens up the possibility to introduce a market 
mechanism, while vertical management control is characterized by a hierarchical 
mechanism.
Horizontal management control is in fact the counterpart of vertical management 
control with a top down control structure. Horizontal management control may imply 
internal client-supplier relationships between essentially equivalent and relatively 
autonomous business units. To a large extent, control over the supplying unit (such as an 
SSC) is then executed by the buying business units. The introduction of an SSC implies 
the development of such horizontal management control.
Vosselman’s original model is depicted in Table 1. It relates important choices in the 
governance structure of services to three critical dimensions of transactions: the 
characteristics of the services (standardized, customized and highly specialized), the 
frequency of the services and the degree of complexity of the service. In certain 
combinations these dimensions lead to a choice for a specific governance structure.
4
Characteristics 
of the services Frequency
Degree of 
complexity Governance structure(s)
Highly
specialized Recurring Low to high
No centralization3 at all 
(decentralization)
Highly
specialized Occasional High
No centralization at all 
(decentralization)
Highly
specialized Occasional Low to intermediate
Horizontal management control 
with captive buying and selling
Customized Recurring High
No centralization at all 
(decentralization)
Customized Recurring Low to intermediate
Horizontal management control 
with captive buying and selling
Customized Occasional Low to high
Horizontal management control 
with a tendency towards captive 
buying and selling
Standardized
Occasional 
to recurring Low to high
Horizontal management control 
with free buying and selling; 
external buy-out; complete 
outsourcing
Table 1. Transactional features and governance structure.4
The management control structures or governance structures in the model range from 
complete decentralization, where business units conduct the services themselves, to 
outsourcing. Essentially, the model predicts that an organization or a business unit will 
keep a frequent and complex specialized service within its own boundaries and will
3 Vosselman (2002) does not distinguish between centralization on the one hand and an SSC on 
the other, as is done by Janssen & Joha (2006). In his article centralization entails combining 
supporting services that originally were conducted within business units. This means that 
centralization in Vosselman is per definition the forming of an SSC.
4 This table is based on Vosselman (2002, p.144), but the order of the table is reversed as this is 
more in line with the explanation of the table in the text.
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exercise hierarchical control. At the other extreme, a standardized service, regardless of 
frequency and the degree of complexity will, according to the model, be governed by the 
market.
In the next section, in order to serve as a basis for the analysis of the PCM case study 
the model will be further tailor-designed to choices regarding SSC-related governance.
2.3. Governance structure choice and an SSC: a theoretical model
In this section, the model will be tailor-designed to choices related to the governance of 
services that (to some extent) are or will be concentrated in an SSC. First, the focus will 
be on potential governance structures that may result when the decision to implement an 
SSC is part of the decision making. Second, the factors that influence the choice of the 
governance structures (characteristics of service, frequency and complexity) will be 
related to the choice of the governance structure.
Governance structures
The governance structures distinguished in the model depicted in Table 1. are categorized 
on a scale of market-oriented governance (outsourcing), to hierarchical governance 
(decentralized model). This analysis focuses on organizations that already have 
established an SSC, or organizations who are considering to establish one. In a way, the 
business units within the organization are then confronted with a make or buy decision. 
Will they conduct the services themselves or are they going to internally or externally 
outsource the services? Internal outsourcing involves the divestiture of services to an 
SSC; external outsourcing involves the divestiture of services to a third party or third 
parties. This last option is of course only possible when there is no ‘captive buying or 
selling’: business unit management then has the opportunity to outsource to external 
parties. If the service is outsourced internally to an SSC, but the internal client has the 
possibility to switch to a third party, there is relatively much market-based control. This 
possibility will be experienced by the SSC-management as an exit threat, which threat is 
essential in a market mechanism. The pressure of external parties thus adds to more 
bureaucratic forms of control exercised by business unit management and to hierarchical
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control exercised by senior management. The market mechanism thus enters the 
organization and complements more bureaucratic and hierarchical mechanisms.
Market-based controls are even stronger in governance structures that correspond with 
external buy-out and outsourcing. With an external buy-out, the SSC is placed outside the 
boundaries of the organization, thus putting less emphasis on hierarchy and more on 
market. In comparison with an SSC governed by buyer-supplier relationships with free 
buying and selling the balance further shifts from hierarchy to market. However, in case 
of an external buy-out a connection between the new and rather independent service 
organization and the mother organization will continue to exist, for example by means of 
long-term contracts and/or a majority of the shares. Weak forms of hierarchical control 
will still remain active.
The most extensive form of market-based control is connected to a complete 
outsourcing of the service. In this case top management of the mother organization has no 
control over the transactions of the supporting services anymore. By way of contracting, 
the business units try to ensure an adequate service level.
In practice though, the choice for a complete outsourcing of a service may be made 
gradually. The process may start with the introduction of an SSC, after which an external 
buy-out may take place. Eventually, business units may get the freedom to structurally 
opt for alternative suppliers. The latter resembles the free market situation (Koene & Van 
der Pijl, 2005).
In sum, based on Vosselman’s model the following governance structures can be 
distinguished (figure 2).
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Governance 
structure based on 
M arket mechanism
Governance 
structure based on 
hierarchical 
mechanism
Figure 2. Types of governance structures
The governance structures within the dotted frame are governance structures that, at least 
partly, exercise control by market pressure.
The question now is which factors determine the choice of the governance structure, 
or, more specifically, which factors determine the balance between market-based controls 
and hierarchy-based controls?
Determining factor 1: Characteristics o f the services
We claim that the classification of services in three categories (standardized, customized 
or highly specialized) as it was made in the original model can be simplified. Our claim 
rests on the assumption that the main consideration of a business unit manager will be 
whether the service should be tailored to its needs (customized) or whether there is a 
standardized service.
SSC with 
captive buying 
and selling
C
 Within the 
business unit
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The distinction between a standardized and customized service is closely linked with 
the concept of asset specificity (Williamson, 1979; 1996). Asset specificity is the degree 
to which the resources for delivering the service are transaction-specific, i.e. specifically 
determined by the specific transactions with a specific customer. Resources for 
standardized services are not transaction-specific, resources for customized services are 
to a greater or lesser extent. If the services are mainly of a standardized nature, the 
likelihood of opportunistic behavior by the supplier is low, and if it occurs, it is easy for 
the client to switch to another supplier. In this case a horizontal governance structure 
containing relatively much market-based control would be efficient.
As the desired level of customization of the service increases, the business unit 
manager is expected to ‘keep it close to himself. He will experience a risk of 
opportunistic behavior by a potential (internal) supplier, to whom he will get ‘locked in’ 
as a consequence of the required specific knowledge and/or required specific other 
investments in the relationship. Therefore, he will consider it to be more efficient to keep 
the service ‘in house’. As the level of customization increases, he is assumed to prefer 
hierarchy-based controls over market-based controls. Schematically this can be depicted 
as in figure 3.
Figure 3. Customized services and governance mechanism
We furthermore theorize that the way customized services are to be governed will depend 
on the degree of complexity.
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Determining factor 2: Degree o f complexity
We claim that a business unit would like to keep complex customized services close to 
her own organization. Outsourcing complex services can increase the dependency of 
other organizations as knowledge and skills are lost; a so called locked-in situation may 
emerge. In order to circumvent possible opportunistic behaviour that emerges as a 
consequence of such a locked-in situation, the control balance shifts into the direction of 
hierarchy-based controls. On the other hand, simple customized services shift the control 
balance into the direction of market-based controls. For example: the cleaning of office 
space, which is a relatively simple service, will allow for relatively much market-based 
control (preferably in an outsourcing relationship), whereas the cleaning of a hospital 
surgery room, which is a complex service that requires very specific proceedings, will 
ask for relatively strong hierarchical control. This step can be visualized as in figure 4.
market
Customized
services
hierarchy
Figure 4. Complexity of the service and governance mechanism 
Determining factor 3: frequency
Yet another factor influencing the governance structure of, particularly, customized 
services is the frequency of the services. An occasional customized service can for 
instance be done by the internal SSC, since such a center assumingly has more 
knowledge to deliver such services than the business unit itself. . In case there is no SSC 
available, such occasional customized services might be expected to be outsourced to 
external parties, since the advantage of better skills and knowledge is likely to exceed the 
disadvantage of possible opportunistic behaviour. In contrast, recurring customized 
services may lead to more hierarchy, as this will prevent opportunistic behaviour from
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occurring while at the same time opportunities for economies of scale can be created. 
Schematically this looks like figure 5.
market
Customized
Services
hierarchy
Figure 5. Frequency and governance structure
2.4. Summary of the model
Figure 6 links the governance structure with the type of service (customized or not), the 
complexity of the customized service (simple or complex) and the frequency of the 
customized service transaction (occasional or recurring).
11
Governance
Figure 6. Transactional factors and governance structure
Figure 6 shows that complex customized services may efficiently be performed by an 
SSC with captive buying and selling, or in the business unit itself. The choice between an 
SSC with captive buying and selling on the one hand and the business unit on the other 
hand, heavily depends on the frequency of the services. The more frequent the complex 
customized services are, the more reason to perform the service activities within the own 
business unit. High frequency of complex customized services makes it possible to 
efficiently acquire and use the capacity needed for the delivery of the services ‘in house’, 
while at the same time benefiting from short communication lines. In other words: both
12
economies of scale (efficient use of capacity) and transaction costs (costs of coordination 
of these complex services) indicate that recurring complex customized services should be 
done within the business unit. Incidental complex customized services on the other hand 
are more efficiently governed within the existing SSC since centralization of supporting 
services makes a better use of capacity possible. As long as this advantage is bigger than 
the disadvantage of higher transaction costs, a business unit manager’s choice for an SSC 
with captive buying and selling is an efficient one. The captiveness of transactions 
prevents transaction costs as a result of potential opportunism by an external party.
Relatively simple customized services needed on a regular basis can also be organized 
in an SSC with captive buying and selling. Concentration of those activities in a 
specialized service center generates economies of scale while transaction costs are 
relatively low. For simple customized services, the role of frequency is such that 
incidental transactions are better governed via the market then via an SSC with captive 
buying and selling.
The next section contains a description of a case study conducted at PCM. Then, the 
data will be confronted with the insights form the model depicted in figure 6.
3. PCM case study
3.1. Case company
PCM is a publisher of daily newspapers and books. The financial data and headcount 
over 2006, 2007 and 2008 are depicted in table 2.5
Sales Net Profit Employees
(x €1.000) (x €1.000) (fte)
2006 670.989 6.369 2.907
2007 644.287 23.991 2.645
2008 629.499 (180.041) 2.423
Table 2. Data PCM Publishers
5 PCM-Uitgevers, Jaarverslag 2007 en Jaarverslag 2008.
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In this case study we focus on the main newspapers published by PCM, namely De 
Volkskrant, NRC-Handelsblad (including nrc.next; from now on we will just use the 
name NRC) and Trouw, and on the SSC that is responsible for the advertisements 
revenues, called PCM-Media.6 The core activities of the newspaper business units are the 
gathering and reporting of the news and the selling of the newspaper. The most important 
sources of income are therefore the revenues from selling the paper and the revenues 
from selling advertisement space.
3.2. Research method
Data were collected using a qualitative research method in the form of a case-study 
(Baarda, De Goede & Teunissen, 2005; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2005). The 
case study began in November 2007 with the aim to identify relationships and structures 
related to horizontal forms of management control. Ten semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with several persons, among others the CEO, the financial director, two 
successive directors of PCM Media, the publishers of the newspapers and other persons 
in and outside the organization who were closely involved with the change of the 
governance structure. In addition, relevant documents were collected, such as annual 
reports, service level agreements and minutes.
The interviews were centered on issues concerning changes of the governance 
structure (the management control structure) regarding advertisements within PCM. The 
open questions particularly (but not exclusively) focused on ‘in house’-activities and 
(internal) transactions and on the way these activities and transactions were controlled.
6 After we finished our case study, many things changed at PCM. The organization was taken 
over by the Belgian Persgroep, the newspaper Algemeen Dagblad (AD) is again fully owned by 
PCM and NRC and the books divisions are for sale (fd.nl 18-6-2009). PCM-Media Merged with 
the advertisements sales department of the Persgroep and is as of September 2009 called 
Persgroep Advertising. “With the newspapers AD, De Volkskrant, Trouw, NRC Handelsblad, 
nrc.next and Het Parool in their portfolio, the Persgroep is the largest newspaper publisher in the 
Nederlands” (http://www.pcm.nl/docs/bpWebsite.asp). It would be interesting to conduct a follow 
up study to the governance structure of this new SSC within the Persgroep.
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We investigated challenges and problems and solutions regarding the (governance of) 
advertisements and emphasized the role of the interviewees. The data were then analyzed 
using the model we developed in the previous sections. The reading of relevant 
theoretical work, discussions with colleagues, several presentations of earlier drafts of 
this paper and feedback of reviewers has led to the paper in its present form. 7
3.3. Changing governance structure at PCM
During 2007 a committee consisting of selected executives prepared a plan for a new 
management control structure or governance structure for PCM. An important reason for 
this was that revenues from advertisements decreased due to increasing competition of 
other media such as television and internet. Business unit management was faced with a 
decrease in profits, and they felt dissatisfied about this. In their eyes PCM-Media (a 
separate department that among other activities sold advertisement space) was 
underperforming. Moreover, they felt that the board of PCM was failing in their 
responsibilities. According to the CEO:
“When I  go back to the past, I  see that cooperation between the newspaper 
business units and PCM-Media was far from optimal. I  think that this partly had to 
do with the assignment o f PCM-Media. It was able to operate independent from the 
business units. There wasn’t much accountability. During three years there was no 
accountability at all. You saw many frictions between the business units and PCM- 
Media, because when sales dropped they immediately blamed PCM-Media of 
course, but the source was the lack o f well prepared plans. How much effort can I  
expect and at which clients? How are you going to do that and also how are you 
being held accountable; what was the performance in comparison with the original 
plans? ”
The old structure can be depicted as in figure 7.
7 Among others we drew on Nicholson, et al. (2006) for the methodological approach. The main 
theoretical source was (Vosselman, 2002).
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Figure 7. Old structure of PCM
In this structure the newspapers operated as departments who were only responsible for 
making the newspaper and for consumer marketing. Other business processes such as 
sales, HRM and strategy were centrally controlled. Sale of advertisements was organized 
in a separate department (PCM-Media), but, from the point of view of the paper business 
units, was seen as a centrally controlled unit and not as a business partner that delivered 
services as an SSC would do. Based on the definition of Jansen & Joha (2006) business 
unit management perceived PCM-Media to be a central department as depicted in figure 
1.
The main reason to change this structure into the direction of an SSC was because the 
executives of the newspapers were held responsible for their profits but couldn’t control 
the advertisements revenues and costs. PCM-Media operated very independently and 
cooperation with the newspapers was rather poor. The newspaper executives wanted their 
profits of course to be as high as possible and, therefore, aimed at an increase of their 
parts of the revenues of PCM-Media. For that reason, PCM-Media and the newspapers 
tried to make budget agreements at the beginning of the year about the revenues. In some 
cases, however, such agreements were not brought forward. But even when management
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succeeded in making an agreement, there was no instrument for the business units to 
enforce the agreements. Moreover, the costs PCM-Media charged to the business units 
were not negotiated, but were simply calculated and allocated by the financial department 
of PCM. This increased the perception that PCM-Media was just a central department; 
there was definitely no clear client-supplier relationship between the newspaper business 
units and PCM-Media. Service Level Agreements (SLA’s) were made, but were of no 
significance to the players in the field. The director of PCM-Media commented on this, 
saying:
“In the past we also made SLA’s, but we didn’t do much with them. They remained 
in the drawer. We have the intention to change that in 2008 and onwards, and 
make better business agreements. ”
Under the old governance structure, PCM-Media was responsible for everything that was 
connected to advertisements sales; from making contacts with clients to back office 
activities. Advertisements space was sold via media agencies, or directly to organizations. 
The back office was responsible for invoicing and other administrative services.
The relation between the various constituencies can be depicted as in figure 8. In this 
picture the word ‘agreements’ is purposively put in quotes, as it is difficult to consider 
them to be ‘real’ agreements.
Figure 8. Old structure sales of advertisements
On the basis of the committee’s advice a change process was started that eventually 
resulted in a new structure in which functional tasks were decentralized to the 
newspapers. This change process was not always easy. The project leader of the change 
process communicated about this:
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“It is changing, but some time ago we hired a consulting agency and they spoke 
with all the big chiefs and wrote: ‘PCM bashing is a sport, even now. ’ ”
This quote indicates that PCM had a culture of resistance to everything that came from 
the board of PCM. Also the phrase “the ministry of newspapers” was heard during the 
interviews.
Although changes are still going on, at the end of 2008 the contours of a more 
permanent structure became visible. The organizational layer Newspapers was removed 
and the newspaper units were transformed from mere departments to profit centers. The 
new structure is reflected in figure 9.
Figure 9. New structure PCM
In this new structure PCM is functioning as a financial holding who keeps more distance 
from the activities of the newspapers (business units). The business units are controlled 
by a two-headed management, a publisher and an editor. The publisher is responsible for 
the business decisions of the business unit. The relationship between the business units 
and PCM Media also changes. The business units are unmistakably responsible for 
profits and get more freedom to realize their ambitions. This opens up the possibility to 
start advertisements sales themselves and to start a better and more equal business 
relation with PCM-Media.
This eventually led to a new governance structure of advertisement sales, enabling 
business unit management to indeed conduct a part of the sales activities themselves. In 
the PCM-strategic plan for 2008 it is described as follows:
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‘Advertisements sales will become a commercial core activity for the business 
units, instead o f a supportive activity, and the organization has to be structured 
accordingly. The director/publisher is responsible for advertisements sales in a 
model that is based on autonomy for the separate business units. ’
The paper business units and PCM-Media made a classification in their advertising 
clients’ data base. In 2008’s SLA it was agreed that PCM-Media would stay responsible 
for the largest part of sales, namely the sales to the 1.500 biggest clients of PCM. It was 
agreed that the remaining smaller clients could also be approached by the business units. 
The future aim and wish of the business units is to reduce the exclusive sales rights of 
PCM-Media to the two hundred biggest clients. However, PCM-Media will continue to 
perform the back office activities for all business units. Among others, these activities 
include accounting, billing and page layout. The business units will establish ‘unit-sales’ 
teams who will approach the other small customers themselves. This will, according to 
business unit management, create an improved alignment between the themes in their 
newspapers and the interests of the clients. A business unit publisher described it as 
follows:
“We have our own story and are better equipped to sell that. Also towards the 
business market, so they understand what unique market share they purchase, 
because that is what counts. You reach a unique audience. ”
The new structure can be depicted as follows (figure 10).
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Figure 10. New structure advertisements sales
The SLA-terms include a clause that the business units are not allowed to outsource the 
advertisements sales to outside parties. So, at least for the short term, there is captive 
buying and selling. From PCM’s strategic plan it is not clear whether this will continue to 
be the case in the future. Quotes, such as ‘it will not be specifically forbidden ’, ‘maybe in 
the future ’ or ‘we did not look into that yet ’ indicate that it is not an option at the moment. 
For the moment it proves that the business units have no other choice than to internally 
outsource the advertisements sales to big clients and back office activities. In turn, the 
director of PCM-Media is not free to work for other external parties.
In sum we may conclude that the governance structure of PCM changed from 
governing the sales of advertisements in a central department towards a structure that 
implies the freedom of business units to sell advertisements ‘in house’ or to internally 
outsource them to an SSC (PCM-Media) with captive buying and selling. The next 
section confronts this change with our theoretical model developed in the previous 
sections.
4. Analysis
4.1. Dimensions of service transactions
This section confronts the dimensions of the service transactions with the theoretical 
model developed in former sections.
Our interpretation of the dimensions of the services is as follows.
Characteristics o f the service
2 0
The core question in this section is whether the services for each business unit are 
customized jobs, or whether the services are comparable and are thus standardized. The 
services PCM-Media provides include sales of advertisement space and administration 
(back office). A large part of the advertisements sales is corporation wide, which means 
that the ads can be sold for all business units, ergo for all newspapers. A smaller part is 
customized; for instance when advertisers have to be found for a specific theme in one of 
the newspapers. This is the case for special weekly newspaper sections of De Volkskrant, 
for instance about health or traveling. For customized ads, more knowledge is required 
about the contents of the theme and, therefore, more specific agreements have to be 
made.
The back office activities don’t need any customization per business unit and can 
therefore be characterized as standardized services.
Complexity
The degree of complexity depends on the advertisers’ demands. The more specific the 
advertisement has to be, the more complex it will become. As complexity increases, more 
internal coordination is needed regarding the advertisement strategy in specific media or 
campaigns.
The interviews, however, show that the sale of specific ads in themselves is not seen 
as very complex. It just calls for a specific focus at PCM-Media.
Frequency
All advertisement services needed by the business units are of a recurring nature. The 
corporation wide advertisements sales and back office activities are daily transactions. 
The specific ads sales for campaigns or weekend papers do occur less frequently, but are 
nevertheless recurring.
4.2. Theory and practice compared: an analysis
By confronting the dimensions of the service transactions with the expected choices 
based on the theoretical model depicted in figure 6, expectations about choices in the 
governance structure can be formulated. This is depicted in table 3.
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Services of PCM- 
Media
Customized Complexity Frequency Governance structure
Corporation wide 
ads sales
No N / A N / A. Outsourcing, external buy­
out or SSC with free buying 
and selling
Specific ads sales Yes Relatively
simple
Recurring SSC with captive buying 
and selling
Back office No N /A N /A Outsourcing, external buy­
out or SSC with free buying 
and selling
Table 3. Services of PCM-Media, nature of transactions and governance structure
In the new structure the rather standardized ads are sold by an SSC (PCM-Media). Our 
model indicates that concentration of these services in an SSC rather than 
deconcentration of the sales activities in the three business units is an efficient choice. 
This enables a more efficient use of resources, and, thus, minimizes production costs and 
incurs economies of scale. It does so without incurring relatively high coordination costs 
and/or (opportunity) costs related to opportunism. So, the decision to opt for an SSC is 
consistent with our modeling. However, the decision to introduce the concept of an SSC 
is accompanied by a decision to maintain the captiveness between the business units and 
PCM-Media. In other words, there will be no free buying and selling. Yet, our model 
indicates that an SSC without captive buying or selling, and therefore, a further shift into 
the direction of market-based control, would be efficient. Abolishing captive buying and 
selling is efficient whenever services are standardized, because the risk of a lock-in effect 
is minimal and there is no ‘small number bargaining’. This would enable the business 
units to switch to other suppliers in case of relatively bad performance and, thus, would 
introduce an exit threat in the governance of services. As a consequence, business unit 
management would be further empowered to control the price-quality ratio of the services 
and, thus, would get more controllability on its economic results. On the other hand, as a
2 2
consequence of increased market control PCM-Media would be better enforced to be 
competitive. One business unit manager stated:
“The question is always i f  you have to buy services from an SSC or i f  you have to 
go to the free market [...] make it a profit centre because then you can start a 
commercial relationship. Otherwise you can just as well do it yourself. What is the 
added value o f the fact that you [internally] outsource? Yes, economies o f scale, 
but I  wonder i f  that is really the case. ”
Apparently, this business unit manager (the Publisher) clearly asks for the freedom to buy 
from outside suppliers. This is consistent with our model.
The sales activities of specific advertisements are located within the business units 
themselves and are the responsibility of so called unit-teams. PCM labels this a strategy 
of decentralization. However, the question remains as to how specific these sales are. The 
interviewees state that PCM-Media eventually will only serve a few hundred of their 
largest clients, and that the other thousands of ‘smaller’ clients will be approached by the 
business units themselves. This is, however, in only a few cases a customized job, and 
even then it is a relatively simple job. In terms of the theoretical model, this would imply 
a governance structure based on an SSC with captive buying and selling, but only if the 
sales are really specific, i.e. customized. Otherwise the sales should be governed via a 
market based structure.
It makes sense to organize the specific advertisements sales in an SSC, since PCM 
already has an SSC running for the corporation wide ads sales. Decentralization and the 
freedom this entails for the business units have led to a structure incorporating both an 
SSC and unit-teams within the business units. A potential disadvantage of this 
decentralization is that diseconomies of scale might result, as different sales persons start 
approaching the same customers.
With regard to the back office activities a conclusion comparable with the conclusion 
related to the corporation wide sales can be drawn. In terms of our theoretical model the 
efficient governance structure would be an SSC with free buying and selling. This would
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lead to the lowest production and transaction costs. However, PCM chooses to 
concentrate these activities in an SSC with captive buying and selling.
In the last section a reflection on these findings and an overall conclusion will be 
drawn.
5. Reflection and conclusion
In order to focus on the efficiency of choices in the governance structure of services, and, 
particularly, of services provided by an SSC, this paper extends Vosselman’s (2002) 
transaction cost economics based model. Next, the extended model was used to get 
insight in the changes of a governance structure at PCM. We focused on the different 
relations between business units and PCM’s SSC. The model confronts the dimensions of 
service transactions with the choice of a specific governance structure. This paper 
assesses the dimensions of the service transactions and confronts choices at PCM with 
the choices the model would predict. It proved that, although PCM chose a governance 
structure with an SSC, it did not opt for free buying and selling, as the model would 
predict. Moreover, in contrast with our modeling the business units chose to do a large 
part of the advertisements sales themselves. Our model would suggest an internal 
outsourcing of these services to the SSC.
These outcomes should not necessarily be interpreted as a flaw of the model, or as a 
failure in practitioner’s judgment. Several reasons can cause these deviations.
A limitation of the model is that the nature of the service transactions cannot 
objectively be determined; different persons might assess the nature of these services 
differently. Moreover, the model is based on strictly economic reasoning. Traditionally, 
outsourcing has been a viable alternative for non-core operations. However, the 
generation of advertisement revenues is perceived as one of the core operations of the 
company and outsourcing these operations may have implications for the company’s 
survival and growth. The governance decisions thus may also have linkages with 
strategy. This strategic aspect is not captured in our modeling.
Another limitation of the model is that it ignores the process of institutionalization. 
For example, it may take publishers a while before they find out what the most efficient 
way of working is in their part of the organization. Therefore, it might very well be that
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in the (near) future the governance structure develops into the direction our model 
predicts. Future research might therefore be more process oriented. The organizational 
change process from a hierarchical control structure towards an SSC structure with 
market-based control or even complete outsourcing of the services might be a guided or a 
drifting process (Andon, Baxter & Chua, 2007; Quattrone & Hopper, 2001). In order to 
explore these change processes we would suggest to do longitudinal case studies that 
enable to study the changes of governance structures in the long run.
Furthermore, based on the case study we have reasons to assume that distrust toward 
the board of PCM and also toward PCM-Media is hindering the choice of an efficient 
governance structure. The publishers do not always believe that PCM-Media is working 
in their best interest, and they think that higher profits can be achieved by keeping the 
services ‘in house’. Trust is not a factor in our transaction cost theory based model. 
However, several authors argue that trust should play an important role in theorizing 
about organizational structures (De Man & Roijakkers, 2009; Nooteboom, 2004; Van der 
Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008; Van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). It would 
therefore be worthwhile to make an attempt to include the construct of trust in our model. 
Furthermore, studying the process through which a governance structure develops can 
benefit from an adoption of the notion of relational signaling as studied by Lindenberg 
(2000) and Six & Nooteboom (2005), as this notion can be seen as a mechanism behind 
interpersonal trust building.
As a final remark, we claim that our model might be used by managers to improve the 
economic rationality of decisions regarding the governance structure. This would enable 
them to consciously decide on governance structure choice and to more critically reflect 
on tendencies of isomorphism in practice. Organizations are inclined to ‘jump on the 
bandwagon’ and, in some cases, this implies a less rational decision making (1983). The 
use of our model therefore might improve the rationality of the decisions.
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